(Group) Strategy-proofness and stability in many-to many marching markets

Antonio Romero-Medina and Matteo Triossi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

No 332, Documentos de Trabajo from Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile

Abstract: We study strategy-profness in many-to many matching markets. We prove that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers and both firms and workers have responsive preferences, the worker-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof and Pareto optimal. Absent any assumption on workers’ references, an Adjusted Serial Dictatorship among workers is stable, group strategy-proof and Pareto optimal for workers. In both cases, the set of stable matchings is a singleton. We show that acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets. Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71, D78. Key words: Keywords: Many-to-many markets, Acyclicity, Stability, Group Strategy-proofness, singleton core.

Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-des
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edj:ceauch:332

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