Single or Multiple Pricing in Electricity Pools?

Ahmed Anwar ()

Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: We present a 2 bidder multi-unit, common cost auction model with uncertain demand and capacity constraints which ensure that the participants sometimes face a residual market share. The model is motivated by electricity pools. We show that a single-price auction where the bidders can submit only one bid for all units weakly dominates an auction where the bidders can make multiple-price bids in terms of average prices. In the case of uniform price auctions we give an example where the dominance is strict.

Keywords: electricity pool; multi-unit auction; revenue ranking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L13 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2006-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edn:esedps:143

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