Strong Enforcement by a Weak Authority

Jakub Steiner

Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: This paper studies the enforcement abilities of authorities with a limited commitment to punishing violators. Commitment of resources sufficient to punish only one agent is needed to enforce high compliance of an arbitrary number of agents. Though existence of other, non-compliance equilibria is generally inevitable, there exist punishment rules suitable for a limited authority to assure that compliance prevails in the long run under stochastic evolution.

Keywords: commitment; enforcement; punishment; stochastic evolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D64 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 2006-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edn:esedps:149

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