Spillovers of Equal Treatment in Wage Offers

Kohei Kawamura () and József Sákovics

Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: We analyse a labour matching model with wage posting, where - reflecting institutional constraints - firms cannot differentiate their wage offers within certain subsets of workers. Inter alia, we find that the presence of impersonal wage offers leads to wage compression, which propagates to the wages for high productivity workers who receive personalised offers.

Pages: 22
Date: 2013-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm, nep-lab and nep-lma
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http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/id221_esedps.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Spillovers of Equal Treatment in Wage Offers (2014)
Working Paper: Spillovers of Equal Treatment in Wage Offers (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edn:esedps:221

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