Product Quality Under Regulated Monopoly

Donald A R George ()
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Donald A R George: https://sites.google.com/site/dargecon60/

Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series from Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh

Abstract: A monopolist regulated via a price cap may well have an incentive to change other variables of interest to consumers, in an attempt to shift the cost and demand curves in his favour. This paper develops a model in which the monopolist can vary product quality and the terms of a warranty, in response to price regulation. The regulated and unregulated monopoly outcomes are compared with the Pareto-efficient outcome.

Pages: 29
Date: 1998-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edn:esedps:4

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