A labor market with targeted wage offers

Sákovics, József
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: József Sákovics

No 2011-52, SIRE Discussion Papers from Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE)

Abstract: We model a market for highly skilled workers, such as the academic job market. The outputs of firm-worker matches are heterogeneous and common knowledge. Wage setting is synchronous with search: firms simultaneously make one personalized o¤er each to the worker of their choice. With large frictions (delay costs), efficient coordination is not possible, but for small frictions efficient matching with Diamond-type monopsony wages is an equilibrium.

Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
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