GOVERNMENT DEFICIT SUSTAINABILITY, AND MONETARY VERSUS FISCAL DOMINANCE: THE CASE OF SPAIN, 1850-2000

Oscar Bajo-Rubio (), Carmen Diaz-Roldan and Vicente Esteve
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Vicente Esteve: Universidad de Valencia, Universidad de La Laguna and Universidad de Alcalá

No 1408, Working Papers from Department of Applied Economics II, Universidad de Valencia

Abstract: In this paper, we provide a test of the sustainability of the Spanish government deficit over the period 1850-2000, emphasizing the role played by monetary and fiscaldominance in order to get fiscal solvency. Since the condition of fiscal solvency was satisfied, government deficit would have been sustainable along the sample period. In addition, the whole period can be characterized as one of fiscal dominance.

Keywords: Fiscal policy; Sustainability; Fiscal Theory of the Price Level; Monetary dominance; Fiscal dominance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 H62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger, nep-his, nep-mac and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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http://repecsrv.uv.es/paper/RePEc/pdf/eec_1408.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Deficit sustainability, and monetary versus fiscal dominance: The case of Spain, 1850–2000 (2014)
Working Paper: Government deficit sustainability, and monetary versus fiscal dominance: The case of Spain, 1850-2000 (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eec:wpaper:1408

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