Rethinking agency theory in developing countries: A case study of Pakistan

Fatima Yusuf, Amna Yousaf and Abubakr Saeed

Accounting forum, 2018, vol. 42, issue 4, 281-292

Abstract: We investigate if agency theory effectively explains agency conflict in the context of a developing country namely, Pakistan. Utilising data from 26 semi-structured interviews, we found that in Pakistan, there is no variation in risk preferences of principals (minority shareholders) and agents (majority shareholders). We also found that remuneration packages and board independence are not effective tools for governing owner managers in Pakistan. Thus, policy makers must shift their focus from soft internal governance mechanisms of appropriate remuneration and board independence. We propose for a rigorous external audit function, and appointment of independent directors and external audit firms by regulator.

Keywords: Agency theory; Developing countries; Board independence; Board remuneration; Principal-principal conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:accfor:v:42:y:2018:i:4:p:281-292

DOI: 10.1016/j.accfor.2018.10.002

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