Do Economic Incentives of Controlling Shareholders Influence Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure? A Natural Experiment

Weixing Cai, Edward Lee, Zhenyu Wu, Alice Liang Xu and Zeng, Cheng (Colin)

The International Journal of Accounting, 2017, vol. 52, issue 3, 238-250

Abstract: We evaluate whether voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure is influenced by the economic incentives of controlling shareholders. To examine this research question, we apply the natural experiment setting based on the Split Share Structure Reform in China. Following this Reform, Chinese state shareholders are allowed to trade their shares in the stock market, which increases their incentives to maximize the market value of the firms that they control. We present empirical evidence of increased CSR disclosure among listed state-owned enterprises after this Reform. This evidence suggests that the economic incentives of key stakeholders are associated with voluntary CSR disclosures.

Keywords: Corporate social responsibility disclosure; Split share structure reform; State-owned enterprise; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G38 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:accoun:v:52:y:2017:i:3:p:238-250

DOI: 10.1016/j.intacc.2017.07.002

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