The role of the strategic apex in shaping the disclosure strategy: A family firm in crisis

Mattias Sandgren, Timur Uman and Mattias Nordqvist

The British Accounting Review, 2024, vol. 56, issue 3

Abstract: This study draws on attribution theory to examine how and by what means the firm's top management team, board members, and owner(s) (i.e., the strategic apex) shape disclosure strategies. Drawing on interviews and archival data spanning six years, we conduct a case study of a financially distressed private family-owned media group. Unique access to these data allowed us to peer into the disclosure strategy formation process that typically takes place behind closed doors in private firms. Our findings show that financial distress preceded the formation of the disclosure strategy and the voluntary disclosure practices designed to satisfy financially powerful stakeholders, and that internal whistleblowers act as a low-cost disclosure tool to inform financially weaker stakeholders. In addition, the development of the disclosure strategy is strongly influenced by the strategic apex, which forms collaborative teams, organises stakeholders and their information needs, and meticulously manages and controls the content and timing of voluntary disclosures. Our findings also suggest that a tightly knit disclosure strategy and voluntary disclosure practices are used to influence rather than inform, to manage stakeholder interactions, and to influence public opinion.

Keywords: Accounting; Reporting; Disclosure strategy; Strategic apex; Family ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:bracre:v:56:y:2024:i:3:s0890838923001646

DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2023.101302

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