Synergizing anti-corruption strategies: Group monitoring and endogenous crackdown – An experimental investigation

Shuguang Jiang, Qian Wei and Lei Zhao

China Economic Review, 2024, vol. 85, issue C

Abstract: In this experimental study, we examine the efficacy of a novel anti-corruption approach that synergistically combines top-down institutional measures with grassroots monitoring by the public. Employing a repeated stranger matching harassment bribe game, we introduce a group monitoring mechanism where the likelihood of corrupt officials being punished increases as more citizens engage in monitoring. Our findings highlight that citizens' decisions to monitor are primarily driven by officials' harassment. Despite facing the social dilemma of anti-corruption, a substantial proportion of citizens willingly incur costs to monitor, resulting in a significant reduction in officials' bribe demands. Although an additional crackdown mechanism slightly decreases citizens' intrinsic motivation, it ultimately enhances the efficiency of anti-corruption outcomes over time, demonstrating its long-term effectiveness.

Keywords: Corruption; Harassment bribe; Group monitoring; Endogenous crackdown; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D73 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1043951X24000476
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chieco:v:85:y:2024:i:c:s1043951x24000476

DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2024.102158

Access Statistics for this article

China Economic Review is currently edited by B.M. Fleisher, K. X. D. Huang, M.E. Lovely, Y. Wen, X. Zhang and X. Zhu

More articles in China Economic Review from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().