EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Contract enforcement efficiency and corporate vertical specialization: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment of “announcement of dishonest persons” in China

Chaoying Li, Chunxiao Geng, Jian Sun and Chun Yuan

China Economic Review, 2024, vol. 87, issue C

Abstract: The role of contracting institutions, particularly the contract enforcement efficiency in shaping corporate vertical boundaries, has been largely overlooked. Using a quasi-natural experiment of the policy of “Announcement of Dishonest Persons” in China, we find that improved contract enforcement efficiency significantly promotes corporate vertical specialization, reflected in the improvement of corporate vertical specialization after the policy implementation. Reduction of transaction costs is the plausible mechanism. Moreover, the above impact is more pronounced when the exposure of firms to Laolai partners (i.e., the policy target), is higher. Finally, we find that efficient contract enforcement promotes total factor productivity through facilitating vertical specialization. This study identifies the causality between contracting institutions and corporate vertical specialization and extends research on consequences of the policy of “Announcement of Dishonest Persons”.

Keywords: Contract enforcement efficiency; Vertical specialization; Announcement of dishonest persons; Laolai (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 L14 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1043951X24001305
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chieco:v:87:y:2024:i:c:s1043951x24001305

DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2024.102241

Access Statistics for this article

China Economic Review is currently edited by B.M. Fleisher, K. X. D. Huang, M.E. Lovely, Y. Wen, X. Zhang and X. Zhu

More articles in China Economic Review from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:87:y:2024:i:c:s1043951x24001305