Historical payoff promotes cooperation in voluntary prisoner's dilemma game

Yini Geng, Chen Shen, Hao Guo, Chen Chu, Dalei Yu and Lei Shi

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2017, vol. 105, issue C, 145-149

Abstract: Voluntary participation, as a simple yet valid mechanism to promote cooperation in game theory, has been received a great deal of attention. Besides, historical payoff has also been verified to be an efficient way of promoting cooperation. Inspired by these facts, here we introduce historical payoff into the measure of fitness in voluntary prisoner's dilemma. In detail, the contribution of historical payoff is decided by the tunable parameter w: when w equals to zero, the traditional voluntary prisoner's dilemma game returns, where no historical payoff is contained; while positive w involves the impact of historical payoff. It is shown that cooperative behavior is remarkably promoted with increment of w for small b; while for large b, system will show the cycle dominance of these strategies and avoid the dominance of defection. This indicates that historical payoff has a positive impact on the evolution of cooperation.

Keywords: Cooperation; Prisoner's dilemma game; Voluntary participation; Historical payoff (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:105:y:2017:i:c:p:145-149

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2017.10.017

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