 Reward depending on public funds stimulates cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma gamesYa Li, Shanxiong Chen and Ben Niu Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2018, vol. 114, issue C, 38-45 Abstract: Prisoner’s dilemma (shortly, PD) games are studied on a square lattice, in which reward mechanisms are considered to stimulate cooperation. It is known to all that results vary with different reward methods. The tax mechanism, an effective tool to adjust the economy, inspires a reward approach where each player should pay corresponding taxes according to their payoff ranks to gather public funds, which is utilized to reward cooperators. There are three main reward levels: high intensity, middle intensity and low intensity. When total public funds keep relatively stable, the reward coverage is determined by the reward intensity. In other words, high intensity of reward is accompanied with narrow range and low intensity accompanies with wide range. Through the proposed model, whether the new reward mechanism can stimulate cooperation and what reward level is the optimum choice could be studied. Simulations reveal that this new mechanism is of great benefit to cooperation and it is noteworthy that low reward intensity with wide coverage has the biggest impact on cooperation. Keywords: Evolutionary game; Prisoner’s dilemma; Square lattice; Reward mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:114:y:2018:i:c:p:38-45 DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2018.07.002 Access Statistics for this article Chaos, Solitons & Fractals is currently edited by Stefano Boccaletti and Stelios Bekiros More articles in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.