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The effects of attribute persistence on cooperation in evolutionary games

Kai Yang, Changwei Huang, Qionglin Dai and Junzhong Yang

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2018, vol. 115, issue C, 23-28

Abstract: In ordinary evolutionary game theory, players update their strategies according to a certain payoff-driven rule. Szolnoki and Perc (2015) [44] found conformity-enhanced network reciprocity by introducing conformity-driven strategy-updating rule to an appropriate fraction of players. In this work, we treat strategy-updating rule as an attribute of players and allow for the evolution of the attribute, for example, the alternation of the strategy-updating rule between payoff-driven and conformity-driven rules with time. We introduce the persistence parameter T by assuming that players change their strategy-updating rules every T Monte Carlo time unit according to either unbiased rule or aspiration rule. We find that frequent alternation of strategy-updating rule improves the conformity-enhanced network reciprocity for the unbiased rule, which leads that small T greatly promotes cooperation. On the other hand, we find no improvement of conformity-enhanced network reciprocity for the aspiration rule.

Keywords: Cooperation; Evolutionary games; Attribute persistence; Conformity-driven; Payoff-driven (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:115:y:2018:i:c:p:23-28

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2018.08.018

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