Heterogeneity reproductive ability promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

Qiuling Wang, Xiaobin Ren, Bo Gao and Jiaqian Wang

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2020, vol. 134, issue C

Abstract: Heterogeneity which widely exists in human society and the biological world, has been proved to be one of the cases that can promote the level of cooperation. For example, the level of cooperation in a heterogeneous network is relatively high when compared with that in a homogeneous network. Recent research has revealed that the effect of heterogeneity in evolutionary game theory depends on the specific definition of heterogeneity and updating rule. In this paper we explore how heterogeneity reproductive ability affects the evolution of cooperation. In this paper we associate reproductive ability with the payoff. A player with a higher payoff and a better environment is more reproductive, which is a common phenomenon existing from human society to bacterial systems. Excitingly, we find that our new constructed rule can dramatically promote cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game. From our numerical result, we also find that moderate heterogeneity can better promote the level of cooperation. Several figures are drawn to explain why heterogeneity reproductive ability can promotes the level of cooperation. Our work finds a new mechanism to promote cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game and reveals why cooperation mushrooms with heterogeneity reproductive ability.

Keywords: Cooperation; Prisoner's dilemma game; Heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:134:y:2020:i:c:s096007792030117x

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2020.109715

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