 Evolutionary dynamics in spatial threshold public goods game with the asymmetric return rate mechanismXianjia Wang and Wenman Chen Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2020, vol. 136, issue C Abstract: In reality, cooperators often are provided a higher return rate for their contributions. Inspired by the reality, this paper introduces the asymmetric return rate mechanism, where the return rate is asymmetric between cooperators and defectors. This paper mainly studies how the asymmetric return rate mechanism influences the evolutionary dynamics in spatial threshold public goods game on two different complex networks, the namely square lattice and Barabási-Albert scale-free network. The simulation results show that increasing the sensitivity for the spread of cooperation is more effective than increasing that for the spread of defection not only to promote cooperation, but also to elevate the provision of the public goods. In addition, a moderate value of threshold is the best to elevate both the promotion of cooperation and the provision of the public goods. Keywords: Evolutionary dynamics; Spatial threshold public goods game; Asymmetric return rate; Particle swarm optimization algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:136:y:2020:i:c:s0960077920302198 DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2020.109819 Access Statistics for this article Chaos, Solitons & Fractals is currently edited by Stefano Boccaletti and Stelios Bekiros More articles in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals from Elsevier |
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