 Increasing pool funds in public goods: The effects of deposit-based delayed rewardsXiaoyang Zhang, Tong Chen, Qiao Chen and Xueya Li Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2020, vol. 140, issue C Abstract: The inspiration for this paper comes from the deposit-based delayed rewards that Mobike company used in its initial promotion. This paper goes to investigate the viability of this method on increasing pool funds in the supply of public goods. We take into account different deposit, reward value and delay time of reward, and take the fraction of cooperators, the sum of contributions and the net profit of organizers as indicators of cooperation success. Our results show that the lower deposit, higher reward or shorter delay time encourages fast cooperation. Furthermore, proper matching of these three factors helps the organizers earn higher profits. Through this approach, organizers have more funds for rewarding from deposits and the delayed-rewards. And the delay of rewards based on the players’ contribution rankings can improve the donations of players. For players, the cost of getting the reward is small because the deposit can be refundable. To sum up, the deposit-based delayed rewards mechanism complements various ways to promote cooperation. Keywords: Deposit-based delayed rewards; Deposit; Reward; Delay; Public goods game (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:140:y:2020:i:c:s096007792030597x DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2020.110201 Access Statistics for this article Chaos, Solitons & Fractals is currently edited by Stefano Boccaletti and Stelios Bekiros More articles in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals from Elsevier |
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