Pool-rewarding in N-person snowdrift game

Kun Li, Yizhou Mao, Zhenlin Wei and Rui Cong

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2021, vol. 143, issue C

Abstract: We extend the N-person snowdrift game (NSG) to incorporate the effects of pool rewarding. An individual who chooses to reward pays a certain cost to provide additional benefits to cooperative behaviors. Thus, rewarding can be considered as a second-order altruistic behavior. But rewarders are actually indirectly protected by defectors as system dynamics evolves. Both the well-mixed version of NSG and the spatial game have been investigated. For well-mixed population, increasing the synergy factor of rewarding r2 facilitates the formation of an oscillating state, while the increment of NSG synergy factor r1 promotes the transition from the stable closed orbit to a fixed state of the system. For structured population, dynamic diversity is dramatically enriched. Especially, the existence of rewarders makes “cooperation monopolization”(the domination of cooperators or rewarders) emerge under feasible parameters. Moreover, for small reward cost, the system dynamics can converge to the absorbing state of rewarding even when the r2 value is low. Larger reward cost, however, is not conducive to the prevalence of rewarding, but dramatically promotes second-order free-riding. Based on this study, we hope to provide guidance for the future research of positive incentives in NSG.

Keywords: Evolutionary game dynamics; Cooperation; Pool rewarding; N-person snowdrift game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960077920309826
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:143:y:2021:i:c:s0960077920309826

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2020.110591

Access Statistics for this article

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals is currently edited by Stefano Boccaletti and Stelios Bekiros

More articles in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thayer, Thomas R. ().