Heterogeneity of reputation increment driven by individual influence promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemma

Jianwei Wang, Jialu He and Fengyuan Yu

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2021, vol. 146, issue C

Abstract: Cooperation is ubiquitous, but our innate selfishness greatly challenge our motivation to cooperate since natural selection favors the fittest individuals in all the ecosystems. In addition, cooperation is costly, implementing it weighs down the individual wealth and the prosperity of human society. Therefore, how to deal with social dilemma has attracted numerous scholars’ attentions. Among previous researches, indirect reciprocity acts a crucial role in the promotion of cooperation. However, scholars focus more on the consistency and constancy of all the players’ reputation fluctuation, and ignore its potential features, the heterogeneity and dynamic of the reputation increment. In real world, such a scenario can reflect it, for example, a famous person and a notorious person have a totally distinct reputation variation even if they have coincident actions. Inspired by aforesaid particularity of reputation variation, a new mechanism, heterogeneity of reputation increment driven by individual influence is introduced, in which players who have more payoffs than the average of their neighbors’ would be more influential, and their actions would lead to a bigger scale of reputation fluctuation due to more attentions from others. Simulation results show that cooperation is facilitated effectively by our new mechanism, compared with traditional model with constant reputation variation.

Keywords: Evolutionary game; Cooperation; Heterogeneity; Indirect reciprocity; Individual influence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S096007792100240X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:146:y:2021:i:c:s096007792100240x

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2021.110887

Access Statistics for this article

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals is currently edited by Stefano Boccaletti and Stelios Bekiros

More articles in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thayer, Thomas R. ().