 Underlying social dilemmas in mixed traffic flow with lane changesFumi Sueyoshi, Shinobu Utsumi and Jun Tanimoto Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2022, vol. 155, issue C Abstract: A new cellular automata traffic model based on Revised S-NFS model is established to consider a mixed flow system in which the maximal velocity of the agents is distributed, as is the case in a real traffic flow fields composed of compact vehicles, trucks, and buses. These vehicles are assigned on of two different strategies: cooperator (C), who remains in his original lane, and defector (D), who undertakes lane-changing to maximize his own payoff, i.e., average velocity. In a systematic series of multi-agent simulations, we quantitatively compare flow characteristics in the default system (where maximal velocity is constant across all agents), mixed traffic flow systems (which permit a distribution of maximal velocities), and correlated–mixed traffic flows, in which an agent with a higher maximal velocity tends to have a D strategy whereas one with a lower maximal velocity tends to have a C strategy. We discuss what kind of game class is underlying in each traffic flow system. Furthermore, we quantitatively study the social efficiency deficit, an index of dilemma extent, for each of the flow systems. Keywords: Social dilemma; Traffic flow; Cellular automaton; Evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:155:y:2022:i:c:s0960077922000017 DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2022.111790 Access Statistics for this article Chaos, Solitons & Fractals is currently edited by Stefano Boccaletti and Stelios Bekiros More articles in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals from Elsevier |
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