Impacts of special cooperation strategy with reward and punishment mechanism on cooperation evolution

Qiuhui Pan, Yue Wang and Mingfeng He

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2022, vol. 162, issue C

Abstract: This paper introduces a special cooperation strategy with both punishment and reward capabilities and analyzes the effect of this strategy on cooperation evolution. The results show that the evolutionary stable states include full defection, the coexistence of ordinary cooperators and defectors, the coexistence of special cooperators and defectors, the coexistence of special cooperators and ordinary cooperators, and the coexistence of the three strategies. Punishment can induce cooperation. Under moderate punishment, the greater the reward the more conducive to cooperation, while under larger punishment, higher rewards conversely weaken the facilitative effect on cooperation. As the temptation increases, ordinary cooperators decrease to zero, while special cooperators increase first and start to decrease or even die out when the ordinary cooperators disappear. The coexistence of the three strategies presents that the ordinary cooperator group is exploited by the defectors, the special cooperator group is invaded by the ordinary cooperators, and the defector group is suppressed by the special cooperators, making the three strategies mutually suppressive and interdependent, and ultimately stable coexistence. The presence of special cooperators significantly promotes cooperation evolution in systems. This contributes to a better understanding of the origins and transformations of social norms and institutions.

Keywords: Social dilemma; Cooperation evolutionary; Reward and punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960077922006427
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:162:y:2022:i:c:s0960077922006427

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2022.112432

Access Statistics for this article

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals is currently edited by Stefano Boccaletti and Stelios Bekiros

More articles in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thayer, Thomas R. ().