Effects of the limited incentive pool on cooperation evolution in public goods game

Sinan Feng and Xuesong Liu

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2023, vol. 169, issue C

Abstract: Cooperative behavior is prevalent in human societies, yet it is often undermined by selfish individuals. Within the framework of evolutionary game theory, pro-social incentives are often considered to be an effective means of promoting cooperation. In fact, however, the resources (including human resources, budget, etc.) to implement incentives are often limited for the institutions. Based on the public goods game, this paper introduces the concept of limited (negative or positive) incentive pool, in which the number of punishers/rewarders that the incentive pool can accommodate is limited. When the capacity of the incentive pool reaches the maximum, the remaining individuals who want to perform the punish/reward behavior will automatically withdraw from the game. Experimental simulations show that the introduction of positive/negative incentive facilitates the promotion and maintenance of cooperation, and that negative incentive is more effective in promoting cooperation and inhibit defection than positive incentives.

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Public goods game; Limited incentive Pool; Evolution of cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:169:y:2023:i:c:s0960077923001960

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2023.113295

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