Asymmetric players in Prisons Dilemma Game
Zhen Han,
Peican Zhu,
Jinling Yang and
Jie Yang
Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2023, vol. 174, issue C
Abstract:
Evolutionary game theory can solve social dilemmas in multiple areas. There are examples in the literature of the use of this approach to analyze topics like economics, social behavior, politics, ecology, etc. In this paper, we propose that evolutionary game theory can be applied to rationalizing human history, especially for understanding warfare and conflicts. Warfare determines the fate of a state and the survival of individuals; this concept can be gleaned from Sun-Tzu, “War is a matter of vital importance to the state; a matter of life or death, the road either to survival or to ruin”. It is evident that the opponents in the war are rarely of equal strength, and that differences in strength exist on all battlefields. Based on numerous examples of warfare in human history, we will propose a new point of view for this research topic, i.e. how asymmetric players choose their strategies in the conflict, and how they will alter their strategies when additional asymmetric players get involved.
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Prisons Dilemma Game; Asymmetric players; Spatial lattices network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:174:y:2023:i:c:s0960077923007932
DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2023.113892
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