Evolution of cooperation in games with dual attribute strategy

Sha Song, Qiuhui Pan, Wenqiang Zhu and Mingfeng He

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2023, vol. 175, issue P1

Abstract: Cooperation and defection are two common strategies in game theory. Considering that there may be a kind of middle state between the two as a third option in the real dilemma, we introduce the dual attribute strategy. Compared with cooperation, this strategy possesses the defection attribute, while compared with defection, this strategy possesses the cooperation attribute. Here, it is assumed that players holding the dual attribute strategy play snowdrift games with cooperators based on their defection attribute, meanwhile, they play another snowdrift game with defectors based on their cooperation attribute. Furthermore, we explore the evolution of the three strategies in the well-mixed population and the structured population, respectively. The results show that the dual attribute strategy is more likely to survive. Additionally, the smaller the two kinds of cost-to-benefit ratios are, the more likely cooperation is to exist. Moreover, in the well-mixed population, the existence of cooperation is independent of the temptation to defect. In the structured population, cooperation is more favorable when the cost-to-benefit ratio between the cooperation strategy and the dual attribute strategy is moderate, regardless of the temptation to defect. The dual attribute strategy is actually the embodiment of the simultaneous weakening of cooperation and defection.

Keywords: Dual attribute strategy; Evolution of cooperation; Prisoner’s dilemma game; Snowdrift game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960077923008706
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:175:y:2023:i:p1:s0960077923008706

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2023.113969

Access Statistics for this article

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals is currently edited by Stefano Boccaletti and Stelios Bekiros

More articles in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thayer, Thomas R. ().