N-player repeated evolutionary trust game under government management

Yuyuan Liu, Linjie Liu, Ruqiang Guo and Liang Zhang

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2023, vol. 175, issue P1

Abstract: Trust game is a common framework for studying trust behavior between unrelated individuals. Previous theoretical research has found that network structure or reputation can promote trust and cooperation, but these studies often assume that interactions between players are one-time and investors have no choice but to invest, which is inconsistent with reality. Here we introduce the conditional investment strategy and government management into a repeated N-player trust game, where investors can make investment decisions based on the investment environment and the government plays the role of a regulator. We consider a reporting mechanism to allow investors to report untrustworthy trustees, thereby the government punishes reported untrustworthy trustees and rewards investors who successfully report untrustworthy trustees. We find that the introduction of the conditional investment strategy and incentives can prompt the evolution of trust. Besides, we reveal that as punishment intensity increases, not only can trust emerge but investment behavior can also be maintained. Furthermore, we verify the above theoretical results by numerical simulations.

Keywords: Repeated trust game; Conditional investment strategy; Government management; Reporting mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:175:y:2023:i:p1:s0960077923009323

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2023.114031

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