The role of Far-Sighted agents on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma

Juan Shi, Xucheng Liu, Jiqin Li, Youqi Shu, Zhen Wang and Jinzhuo Liu

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2023, vol. 176, issue C

Abstract: Why would natural selection facilitate the prevailing cooperation in selfish groups of individuals? A common framework for studying this problem is evolutionary game theory. Here, we propose a new strategy update rule, called the far-Sighted update rule, that enables agents to take into account the possible responses of their neighbors, which means a far-Sighted agent does not have a short-sighted, static view of the environment but rather a long-term view that considers environmental changes. We study the effect of the far-Sighted update rule on behavioral evolution in two cases. The level of cooperation can be significantly promoted for populations of myopic agents acting with a certain probability with the far-Sighted update rule. The cooperation rate of the population did not drop below a threshold even under very hostile conditions. Moreover, the stronger the intelligence’s willingness to consider long-term views is, the larger this threshold will be. The theoretical results of the mean field are consistent with the simulation results. However, for far-Sighted agents, which act exactly as far-Sighted update rule, it shows sensitivity to the network structure. In a mixed population of far-Sighted agents and myopic agents, even if all myopic agents become defectors, the far-Sighted agents can still maintain a certain cooperator ratio. Thus, our work can help to understand the evolution of populations of agents with a higher intelligence that can consider environmental changes.

Keywords: Cooperation; Strategy update rule; Mean-field theory; Myopic; Prisoner’s dilemma; Network spatial structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960077923010664
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:176:y:2023:i:c:s0960077923010664

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2023.114164

Access Statistics for this article

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals is currently edited by Stefano Boccaletti and Stelios Bekiros

More articles in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thayer, Thomas R. ().