Coevolution of cognition and cooperation in structured populations under reinforcement learning

Rossana Mastrandrea, Leonardo Boncinelli and Ennio Bilancini

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2024, vol. 182, issue C

Abstract: We study the evolution of behavior under reinforcement learning in a Prisoner’s Dilemma where agents interact in a regular network and can learn about whether they play one-shot or repeatedly by incurring a cost of deliberation. With respect to other behavioral rules used in the literature, (i) we confirm the existence of a threshold value of the probability of repeated interaction, switching the emergent behavior from intuitive defector to dual-process cooperator; (ii) we find a different role of the node degree, with smaller degrees reducing the evolutionary success of dual-process cooperators; (iii) we observe a higher frequency of deliberation.

Keywords: Dual process cooperation; Cognition; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Network; Agent based model; Structured populations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Coevolution of cognition and cooperation in structured populations under reinforcement learning (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:182:y:2024:i:c:s0960077924003515

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2024.114799

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