Unveiling the masks: Deception and reputation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

Kai Xie, Yaojun Liu and Tingjin Liu

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2024, vol. 186, issue C

Abstract: The topic of how to solve cooperation dilemma has been extensively investigated, and numerous mechanisms involved third-party identities have been proposed to promote cooperation level. This paper considers a more realistic strategy named pseudo-cooperation (PC) in the prisoner’s dilemma game, characterized by incomplete cooperation. Participants employing this strategy attempt to deceive others by superficial cooperation, thereby resulting in payoff increases when confronted with other strategies. Moreover, distinct strategic choices lead to dynamic changes in players’ reputation, which in turn directly influences their income. Specifically, the reputation is incorporated into part of individuals’ payoff rather than indirectly affecting them. Simulation experiments are respectively conducted in well-mixed and structured populations, and the results demonstrate that the reputation-based PC strategy significantly facilitates the emergence of cooperation behaviors in both environments. Furthermore, the criteria for the three types of players to emerge, vanish or dominate the system can be partially identified in well-mixed populations. Importantly, the region of high cooperation density in the square network is wider than those in well-mixed populations, which displays the positive role of network reciprocity.

Keywords: Cooperation; Evolution game; Pseudo-cooperation strategy; Prisoner’s dilemma game; Reputation mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960077924007860
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:186:y:2024:i:c:s0960077924007860

DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2024.115234

Access Statistics for this article

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals is currently edited by Stefano Boccaletti and Stelios Bekiros

More articles in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thayer, Thomas R. ().