The supply-side of corruption and limits to preventing corruption within government procurement and constructing ethical subjects

Prem Sikka and Glen Lehman

CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, 2015, vol. 28, issue C, 62-70

Abstract: Corruption in government procurement programs is a perennial problem. The paper by Dean Neu, Jeff Everett and Abu Shiraz Rahaman emphasises the value of internal controls in government departments in constraining individuals and promoting ethical conduct. In response, this paper argues that good internal controls in government departments, though highly desirable, are unlikely to make a significant dent in corrupt practices to secure government contracts. A major reason for this is the supply of corruption by corporations keen to secure lucrative contracts. Within the spirit of contemporary capitalism, they have an insatiable appetite for profits and have shown willingness to engage in corrupt practices to secure government departments. The issues are illustrated with the aid of two case studies. It is argued that the supply-side of corruption severely limits the possibilities of preventing corruption in government procurement.

Keywords: Corruption; Government procurement; Internal controls (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1045235415000192
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:crpeac:v:28:y:2015:i:c:p:62-70

DOI: 10.1016/j.cpa.2015.01.008

Access Statistics for this article

CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING is currently edited by Marcia Annisette, Christine Cooper and Yves Gendron

More articles in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().