Career concerns and multitasking local bureaucrats: Evidence of a target-based performance evaluation system in China

Yvonne Chen, Pei Li and Yi Lu

Journal of Development Economics, 2018, vol. 133, issue C, 84-101

Abstract: This paper examines whether a target-based performance evaluation system can properly motivate local bureaucrats to implement an environmental regulation policy at the cost of slow economic growth. In late 2005, the Chinese central government made cutting sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions the main performance evaluation criterion for prefectural city mayors and Party secretaries. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we find that the performance evaluation system caused a significant decrease in SO2 emissions, as well as in the GDP growth rate. Our mechanism analyses further corroborate that local bureaucrats in Two Control Zone cities were willing to trade off GDP growth to achieve the more stringent emissions reductions goal. Our findings contribute to the understanding of multitasking agency problems for government agents.

Keywords: Target-based performance evaluation; Air pollution; Economic growth; Multitasking agency problem; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (193)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387818300245
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:133:y:2018:i:c:p:84-101

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.02.001

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Development Economics is currently edited by M. R. Rosenzweig

More articles in Journal of Development Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().