Physician agency in China: Evidence from a drug-percentage incentive scheme

Bingxiao Wu

Journal of Development Economics, 2019, vol. 140, issue C, 72-89

Abstract: This paper examines how physicians respond to financial incentives in China. Faced with the requirement to lower drug expenditure as a percentage of the total medical expenditure, physicians increased non-drug expenditure in addition to decreasing drug expenditure, keeping the total expenditure at the historical level. This shift in the expenditure mix was observed only among insured patients, highlighting the role of patient insurance status in affecting the extent to which physician agency drives medical decision making.

Keywords: Physician agency; Chinese health care system; Drug percentage; Healthcare expenditure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 M52 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387818305091
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:140:y:2019:i:c:p:72-89

DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.05.007

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Development Economics is currently edited by M. R. Rosenzweig

More articles in Journal of Development Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().