Strategic central bank communication: Discourse analysis of the Bank of Japan’s Monthly Report

Kohei Kawamura, Yohei Kobashi, Masato Shizume and Kozo Ueda

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2019, vol. 100, issue C, 230-250

Abstract: We conduct a discourse analysis of the Bank of Japan’s Monthly Report and examine its characteristics in relation to business cycles. We find that ambiguous expressions tend to appear more frequently with negative expressions, and this tendency is more pronounced in recessions. This suggests that the central bank communicates strategically by obfuscating the reports when their private information is unfavorable.

Keywords: Monetary policy; Transparency; Natural language processing; Modality; Latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA); Verifiable disclosure model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 D82 E58 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:100:y:2019:i:c:p:230-250

DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2018.11.007

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