Learning about banks’ net worth and the slow recovery after the financial crisis
Josef Hollmayr and
Michael Kühl ()
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2019, vol. 109, issue C
Abstract:
We examine the influence of information rigidities about the net worth of banks on the real economy over time. In a first part, we show empirically that expectations about the net earnings of banks (as a proxy for the growth of net worth) are biased, particularly during the financial crisis. Investors display a learning behavior in forming expectations about future bank earnings during the crisis. In a second part, by drawing on a New Keynesian general equilibrium model with a banking sector, we demonstrate that, by quantitatively incorporating this type of information updating and expectations formation about the net worth of banks, noisy information is able to produce a slow recovery in the aftermath of the financial crisis and match the data more closely than in the full information rational expectation (FIRE) case.
Keywords: DSGE Model; Survey data; Imperfect information; Learning; Slow recovery (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E3 E44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:109:y:2019:i:c:s0165188919301733
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2019.103776
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