Evolutionary dynamics in bilingual games

Srinivas Arigapudi

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2024, vol. 165, issue C

Abstract: In two-strategy coordination games with distinct payoff- and risk-dominant equilibria, existing results show that the inefficient risk-dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected under many evolutionary dynamics. In the above class of coordination games, we study the effect of introducing a bilingual strategy that is compatible with both of the existing strategies. An agent playing the bilingual strategy incurs an additional adoption cost but never miscoordinates with any other agent. We show that if the adoption cost of the bilingual strategy is low, then the efficient payoff-dominant equilibrium can be uniquely selected under many evolutionary dynamics.

Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165188924000903
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:165:y:2024:i:c:s0165188924000903

DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2024.104898

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control is currently edited by J. Bullard, C. Chiarella, H. Dawid, C. H. Hommes, P. Klein and C. Otrok

More articles in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().