Dynamic bankruptcy procedure with asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders

Michi Nishihara and Takashi Shibata ()

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2018, vol. 90, issue C, 118-137

Abstract: We develop a dynamic model in which a distressed firm optimizes the bankruptcy choice and its timing. When the distressed firm’s shareholders sell the assets, they are better informed about the asset value than outsiders are. Most notably, we show that this asymmetric information can delay the asset sales to signal asset quality to outsiders. More debt and lower asset value can reduce the signaling cost and mitigate the asset sales delay. We also show that the firm changes the bankruptcy choice from selling out to liquidation bankruptcy when the signaling cost associated with selling out is high. This distortion in the bankruptcy choice greatly lowers the debt value, whereas it has a weak impact on the equity value.

Keywords: Bankruptcy; Adverse selection; Accounting quality; Signaling game; Real options; M&A (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G13 G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Dynamic bankruptcy procedure with asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:90:y:2018:i:c:p:118-137

DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2018.02.006

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