Procedural Fairness and Tax Compliance

Martina Hartner (), Silvia Rechberger (), Erich Kirchler () and Alfred Schabmann ()
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Alfred Schabmann: University of Vienna (Austria)

Economic Analysis and Policy, 2008, vol. 38, issue 1, 137-152

Abstract: For taxpayers it is important to be treated in a procedurally fair and respectful manner, especially when being committed to pay their share of taxes and feeling identified with the nation. In case of perceived unfair treatment and processes of unfair decision making, taxpayers resist paying the whole amount of their taxes due. In this article the relationship between taxpayers’ treatment by tax authorities and non-compliance was further investigated. Based on the group engagement model (Tyler and Blader 2000, 2003), it was shown that procedural justice positively affects motivational postures of deference (Braithwaite 2003) and negatively affects motivational postures of defiance (Braithwaite 2003). Additionally, this relationship was partly mediated by national identity judgments. Regarding the influence on actual tax behavior, only a significant effect from motivational postures of defiance on non-compliance was obtained from the current data.

Keywords: Tax Compliance; Procedural Justice; Motivational Postures; Social Identity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:38:y:2008:i:1:p:137-152

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