 Fiscal decentralization, government self-interest and fiscal expenditure structure biasSen Li and Guangying Li Economic Analysis and Policy, 2024, vol. 81, issue C, 1133-1147 Abstract: Fiscal decentralization strengthens local governments' authority and expenditure responsibilities, improves the efficiency of financial resource allocation, and has a far-reaching and unique impact on local governments' expenditure behavior. The government's self-interest must be premised on the public nature, and the overexpansion of self-interest will inevitably bring a series of drawbacks and jeopardize the high-quality development of the economy. Does the incentive of fiscal decentralization to local governments increase their self-interest to a certain extent, leading to changes in the expenditure structure? This paper examines the impact of fiscal decentralization on the degree of self-interest of local governments, and the degree of self-interest of local governments on the bias of fiscal expenditure structure by using inter-provincial panel data in China from 2005 to 2020. It is found that fiscal decentralization expands the degree of self-interest of local governments, leading to a bias in the expenditure structure towards non-livelihood expenditures. Keywords: Fiscal decentralization; Government self-interest; Expenditure structure (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecanpo:v:81:y:2024:i:c:p:1133-1147 DOI: 10.1016/j.eap.2024.01.014 Access Statistics for this article Economic Analysis and Policy is currently edited by Clevo Wilson More articles in Economic Analysis and Policy from Elsevier |
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