Vaccination policy and trust

Artyom Jelnov and Pavel Jelnov

Economic Modelling, 2022, vol. 108, issue C

Abstract: A corrupt government may not only fail in provision of public goods but also generate mistrust that depresses demand for essential public goods. The effect of corruption on supply of public goods is well studied, but much less is known about the demand side. Using UNICEF panel data on vaccination, we find that countries perceived as less corrupt and more liberal experience higher vaccination rates. Furthermore, they are less likely to adopt a mandatory vaccination policy. We show theoretically that the mechanism that generates this result is the lower probability of a transparent and accountable government to promote an unsafe vaccine.

Keywords: Vaccination; Corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Vaccination Policy and Trust (2021)
Working Paper: Vaccination Policy and Trust (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:108:y:2022:i:c:s0264999322000190

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2022.105773

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