How effective are Governor's party affiliated campaign promises on crime? Evidence from U.S. states
Swarup Joshi
Economic Modelling, 2022, vol. 113, issue C
Abstract:
Criminal justice policies are contested issues during gubernatorial campaigns, with Republicans advocating for tough policies, and Democrats for reforms. The controversy is exacerbated by lack of research on what actually works. Policies and rhetoric used by candidates could impact voter's decision and real world outcomes. In this paper, I use Regression Discontinuity Design framework to investigate the causal impact of party affiliation on crime, with affiliation serving as a proxy for policies. Although past research has shown some success of party affiliated campaign promises (education spending, labor market, etc.), I fail to find evidence of impact on crime rates in the short run. For potential mechanism, I find that governors do not impact criminal justice policy metrics. Thus, given the controversial nature of crime, it is difficult to deliver drastic changes, as such the effectiveness of crime related campaign promises in the short run is unreliable.
Keywords: Politics; Crime; Regression discontinuity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 K10 K11 K14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:113:y:2022:i:c:s0264999322001225
DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2022.105876
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