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To tax or not to tax? When does it matter for informality?

Shalini Mitra

Economic Modelling, 2017, vol. 64, issue C, 117-127

Abstract: Theoretical models generally always predict or assume that higher taxes lead to larger informal sectors. Empirically, however, there is considerable debate on the effect of taxes on informality. In this paper I show that whether a positive, negative or non-relation arises between tax rates and informality depends on the degree of tax enforcement and the level of credit market development in an economy. Higher enforcement implies a higher probability of detection and punishment while more credit implies better formal sector access to finance. Both are incentives to become formal. In a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model with borrowing constraints, I show that informality rises with the tax rate up to a threshold level of tax enforcement beyond which it falls as tax increases. This enforcement threshold depends negatively on the level of credit in the economy.

Keywords: Taxation; Informality; Financial frictions; Tax enforcement; Financial development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E26 E60 H26 O11 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:64:y:2017:i:c:p:117-127

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2017.02.024

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