Hierarchical governance in invasive species survey campaigns

Denys Yemshanov, Robert G. Haight, Chris J.K. MacQuarrie, Mackenzie Simpson, Frank H. Koch, Kathleen Ryan and Erin Bullas-Appleton

Ecological Economics, 2022, vol. 201, issue C

Abstract: Large-scale delimiting surveys are critical for detecting pest invasions and often undertaken at different governance levels. In this study, we consider two-level hierarchical planning of surveys of harmful invasive pests including a government agency with a mandate to report the spatial extent of an invasion, and regional governments (counties) concerned about the possible threat of an outbreak. The central agency plans delimiting pest surveys across multiple administrative subdivisions. Counties could participate in these surveys if funds become available. Our goal is to find the optimal levels of cooperation between the central agency and regional governments in the form of the central agency sharing funds with regional governments in a way that benefits both it and the other entities. We propose a Stackelberg game model that finds optimal levels of collaboration between two levels of government in large-scale pest survey campaigns. We apply the model to surveillance of hemlock woolly adelgid, a harmful pest of hemlock trees in Ontario, Canada. Our solutions help anticipate the underperformance of surveys conducted by regional governments because their goals do not fully align with the central agency survey objective. The methodology can be adapted to explore governance hierarchies in other regions and political jurisdictions.

Keywords: Bi-level governance; Hemlock woolly adelgid; Pest surveys; Uncertainty; Bi-level optimization; Stackelberg game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800922002130
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:201:y:2022:i:c:s0921800922002130

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2022.107551

Access Statistics for this article

Ecological Economics is currently edited by C. J. Cleveland

More articles in Ecological Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().