Public goods and optimal paternalism under present-biased preferences

Thomas Aronsson and David Granlund

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 113, issue 1, 54-57

Abstract: This paper concerns the provision of a state-variable public good in a two-type model under present-biased consumer preferences. The preference for immediate gratification facing the high-ability type weakens the incentive to adjust public provision in response to the self-selection constraint.

Keywords: Public; goods; Quasi-hyperbolic; discounting; Redistribution; Asymmetric; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:113:y:2011:i:1:p:54-57

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