Spatial electoral competition with a probabilistically favored candidate

Dimitrios Xefteris

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 116, issue 1, 96-98

Abstract: This paper studies unidimensional electoral competition between two office-motivated candidates, where one of them enjoys a probabilistic and non-policy advantage over the other. We consider a finite number of voters who have single peaked preferences and whose ideal policies are not known to the candidates. Unlike the deterministic-advantage models we find that the Downsian pure strategy equilibrium is in this environment the unique Nash equilibrium of the game when the electorate is sufficiently large.

Keywords: Spatial competition; Candidate quality; Probabilistic advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:1:p:96-98

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.022

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