Renegotiation of public contracts: An empirical analysis

Francesco Decarolis and Giuliana Palumbo

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 132, issue C, 77-81

Abstract: Using a dataset of public contracts awarded in Italy between 2000 and 2007, we document two facts: (i) both price and time renegotiations are systematic, but nearly uncorrelated to each other; (ii) renegotiations are linked to the project design stage.

Keywords: Procurement; Auctions; Renegotiations; Delays; Overruns (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 H57 L22 L74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:132:y:2015:i:c:p:77-81

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.04.025

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