On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types

Alexey Kushnir ()

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 133, issue C, 4-6

Abstract: We show that for any mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism for social choice environments with correlated types when agent’s matrix of conditional probabilities satisfies the full rank condition.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Dominant strategy implementation; Surplus extraction; Correlation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:133:y:2015:i:c:p:4-6

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.001

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