Monopoly price discrimination and privacy: The hidden cost of hiding

Paul Belleflamme and Wouter Vergote

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 149, issue C, 141-144

Abstract: A monopolist can use a ‘tracking’ technology to identify a consumer’s willingness to pay with some probability. Consumers can counteract tracking by acquiring a ‘hiding’ technology. We show that consumers may be collectively better off absent this hiding technology.

Keywords: Price discrimination; Privacy; Monopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D18 L12 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Monopoly price discrimination and privacy: the hidden cost of hiding (2016)
Working Paper: Monopoly price discrimination and privacy: the hidden cost of hiding (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:149:y:2016:i:c:p:141-144

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.027

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