Information sharing in private value lottery contest

Zenan Wu and Jie Zheng

Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 157, issue C, 36-40

Abstract: We investigate players’ incentives to disclose information on their private valuations of the prize ahead of a rent-seeking contest: Information sharing arises in equilibrium if types are concentrated enough, whereas sharing information is strictly dominated if types are sufficiently dispersed.

Keywords: Tullock contests; Private values; Information sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:157:y:2017:i:c:p:36-40

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.030

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