Deterministic mechanisms, the revelation principle, and ex-post constraints
Felix Jarman and
Vincent Meisner
Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 161, issue C, 96-98
Abstract:
This note establishes a revelation principle in terms of payoff for deterministic mechanisms under ex-post constraints: the maximal payoff implementable by a feasible deterministic mechanism can also be implemented by a feasible deterministic direct mechanism.
Keywords: Mechanism design; Revelation principle; Ex-post constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Working Paper: Deterministic Mechanisms, the Revelation Principle, and Ex-Post Constraints (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:161:y:2017:i:c:p:96-98
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.039
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