The power of the largest player

Sascha Kurz

Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 168, issue C, 123-126

Abstract: Decisions in a shareholder meeting or a legislative committee are often modeled as a weighted game. Influence of a member is then measured by a power index. A large variety of different indices has been introduced in the literature. This paper analyzes how power indices differ with respect to the largest possible power of a non-dictatorial player. It turns out that the considered set of power indices can be partitioned into two classes. This may serve as another indication which index to use in a given application.

Keywords: Power measurement; Weighted games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:168:y:2018:i:c:p:123-126

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.034

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